How Joel Gascoigne Spent Three Years Following All the Right SaaS Advice, and Nearly Killed Buffer

Buffer spent ten years growing, scaled smoothly to around $22 million a year in revenue, and built a loyal community along the way. Then, right around 2020, they hit a plateau. Over the next three years, the business slid into a decline, losing 20% of its revenue.

Joel Gascoigne’s talk at BoS USA 2025, “Navigating a Multi-Year Decline to New All-Time Highs,” makes an uncomfortable case: Buffer didn’t start tanking because they made stupid mistakes. They started tanking because Joel followed the exact advice every SaaS expert tells you to follow.

The Playbook Trap

When growth first slowed down, Joel did exactly what the startup textbooks say to do. He decided to focus on a narrower type of customer, choosing direct-to-consumer e-commerce brands because they relied so heavily on social media. To make more money from each existing customer, the team restricted the free plan, raised the Pro tier from $10 to $15 while cutting features, and eventually hid the free sign-up option altogether. They also started building more products so they could sell customers more than one thing at a time, and hired search firms to run four executive hunts at the same time.

On paper, the early data looked good. They were making more money per customer. But their paying customer count was collapsing underneath it. They told themselves the drop was just a natural side effect of chasing bigger, pricier customers. By the time the pandemic added its own pressure, the business was in a real spiral.

Two Different Ways to Grow

It took Joel three years to see this: there isn’t one universal way to scale a tech company. There are two different ways to run one, and mixing them up is exactly how you end up squeezing a company that was never built to be squeezed. One way relies on a small number of customers who each pay a lot, get personal attention, and see their prices go up steadily over time. The other relies on a large number of customers, a simple product, a strong flow of people trying it free and slowly deciding to pay, and small, steady growth in revenue over time.

Buffer was built from day one to be the second kind of company. Forcing it to act like the first, just to chase bigger customers and higher prices, put them on a path where they were squeezing more out of a shrinking base instead of delivering more to a wider one.

Turning Inward

Before any of that, Joel hit his own wall. After the layoffs and after his co-founder left, he thought he had things stabilized. Then he burned out completely. In his words, he couldn’t get out of bed. He took six weeks off, did nothing for a while, then slowly built himself back up. It’s a pattern that shows up a lot after burnout: once someone recovers, they usually come back wanting a fresh start, wanting to change things so they don’t end up in the same place again. That’s probably part of why the decisions that followed were so personal. He’d already had to lay off ten people once. He didn’t want to be in a position where that happened again.

I keep noticing this pattern, not just with Joel. The best decisions a company ever makes rarely come from a strategy deck. They come from the worst, most personal moments a founder goes through, the ones they never planned for and can’t fully explain to anyone else. Joel didn’t get to four day work weeks or a people first culture through a growth framework. He got there because he broke down first, and decided he never wanted to put anyone else through what broke him.

That same instinct, to look after people first, is where the four day work week came from. It started in May 2020, in the middle of the pandemic, when Joel’s team was dealing with kids at home and life turned upside down. For Joel, trying it felt like an easy call. For the team, it felt almost too good to be true, a full extra day off with no cut in pay or hours squeezed into the rest of the week. They ran a one month trial, then a six month pilot, and it just stuck. It’s still how Buffer operates today, five and a half years later.

Two years after that, in 2022, the same instinct showed up again in a bigger decision. Joel stopped the executive searches. He realized bringing in more managers during a decline just added distance between himself and the actual work. He took on the direct reports himself, told the product and marketing teams who’d been stuck waiting for a new leader that they were a complete team now, and it was time to build.

They shifted the company out of just managing the decline and back into actually building again. They ran team-wide weeks focused only on shipping, to pick up speed, and finally tackled the old, avoided technical problems everyone had been too afraid to touch.

Strategically, Joel reversed the push toward bigger customers with a framework he calls Down and Wide. Down meant targeting individual creators, early entrepreneurs, and small businesses, the opposite direction of competitors like Hootsuite. Wide meant keeping the product flexible enough to handle a wide range of social channels.

They brought the free tier back as a core part of the business instead of something hidden. They changed the main button on their homepage to send visitors straight to free sign-up instead of a pricing page. Monthly sign-ups jumped from 65,000 to 85,000 almost immediately.

Back to All-Time Highs

By matching the business to what Buffer actually was, instead of what the textbooks said it should be, the business recovered. In 2024, Buffer grew revenue by 9%. By 2025, they were back to all-time highs in paying customers, hit a healthy balance of growth and profit that most SaaS companies chase and rarely reach, and were projecting $2.5 million in net income, all while still running on a four day work week. They even started proactively canceling subscriptions for customers who were paying but inactive, on the idea that long-term trust matters more than inflating short-term numbers.

Joel nearly lost Buffer by making good calls that belonged to someone else’s business. If you’re running a company right now and something feels off even though you’re doing everything the way you’re “supposed” to, that might be your answer too. Before you copy the next piece of advice from a founder you admire, ask yourself if you’re actually building the same kind of business they are. And ask yourself, honestly, whether the people inside your company are doing okay. Buffer only found its way back once Joel stopped treating both questions as separate.

Jason Cohen’s “Escaping the Growth Ceiling” talk uses Buffer’s real churn numbers as its worked example, and Cohen’s own approved post already references Joel’s talk as a companion piece. Worth cross-linking the two once both are published.